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Abstract
We study a search model where workers can send multiple applications to high and low productivity
firms. Firms that compete for the same candidate can increase their wage oﬀers as often as they like.
We show that there is a unique equilibrium where workers mix between sending both applications to the
high and both to the low productivity sector. Eﬃciency requires however that they apply to both sectors
because then the coordination frictions are lowest. For many configurations, the equilibrium outcomes
are the same under directed and random search. Allowing for free entry creates a second source of
ineﬃciency.
JEL codes: D83, E24, J23, J24, J64
1 Introduction
We study a portfolio problem where unemployed workers must decide in which sector(s) to search. Workers
know the productivity in each sector but learn about the wage at a specific firm after applying there. We
allow firms that compete for the same candidate to increase their oﬀers as often as they like.
Specifically, we consider a large labor market with identical workers and a high and a low productivity
sector. Within a sector, all firms are identical. Workers can send 0, 1 or 2 applications at a cost k > 0
for each application. Each vacancy that receives one or more candidates randomly picks a candidate and
oﬀers the job to him. The other applications are rejected. We are interested in symmetric pure strategy
equilibria (in terms of the number of applications) and their eﬃciency properties. Interestingly, it cannot
be an equilibrium for workers to send just one application because then firms have no incentives to oﬀer
a positive wage. This is basically the Diamond (1971) paradox. Therefore, if k is suﬃciently low, workers
always send two applications, hoping to get a positive payoﬀ by receiving two oﬀers. But this on its turn
implies that workers will never apply to both sectors (HL) because this strategy is strictly dominated by
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sending both applications to the low productivity sector (LL). The intuition behind this result is that in
order for workers to be willing to apply to the low productivity sector, the expected number of applications
must be lower there. However, the expected payoﬀs of receiving an oﬀer from a high and a low productivity
firm is the same as receiving oﬀers from two low productivity firms because a high productivity firm that
(Bertrand) competes with a low productivity firm for the same candidate will win and pay the productivity
level of the worker at the low productivity firm. So, the worker’s payoﬀs conditional on getting two oﬀers
are the same for a worker who sends both applications to the low productivity sector (LL) and a worker who
plays HL, but the probability of receiving two oﬀers is higher for the first worker. We then show that there
is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium where workers send both applications with probability q∗HH to the
high productivity sector and with probability 1 − q∗HH to the low productivity sector where q∗HH depends
on the relative productivity and the relative supply of vacancies in each of the sectors. As in Albrecht et al.
(2006) there are two coordination problems in the matching process: (1) workers do not know where other
workers apply to and (2) firms do not know which candidate other firms consider.
By allowing workers to apply to diﬀerent sectors, the degree of coordination frictions becomes partly
endogenous, even for a given number of applications per worker. Workers do however not internalize the
eﬀects of their portfolio choice on the aggregate coordination frictions. They just want to maximize the
productivity-weighted probability to receive multiple oﬀers. Therefore, the resulting equilibrium is not
eﬃcient and unemployment is too high. An important reason for the ineﬃciency is that a social planner
would like some or all workers to apply to both sectors in order to reduce the coordination problems in the
matching process. This does not occur however because the expected payoﬀs of this strategy are too low, since
high productivity firms would either pay the monopsony wage or the productivity level of a low productivity
firm in case the worker has two oﬀers. Since the expected payoﬀ of playing HL is independent of high
productivity output, workers incentives are distorted. Another source of ineﬃciency is that because of the
coordination frictions, the matching function is non-monotonic in the number of applications. When there
are relatively few vacancies, the second coordination problem is severe and the matching rate is decreasing
in the number of applications. The planner internalizes this while individual workers apply too often to the
high productivity sector. A similar problem arises at the academic job market where the top universities
typically receive too many applicants.
The fact that search is random and not directed is not driving our ineﬃciency result, since we show that
if the number of firms in the market or the diﬀerence in productivity between both sectors is not too large,
the equilibrium outcomes are the same as in the equilibrium of the directed search version of our model
where firms can post a wage ex ante and workers observe all wages.1 The reason for this is the same as
the one in Albrecht et al. (2006) where posted wages are zero. They consider the case where all workers
and firms are identical and they show that the existence of ex post competition makes it still attractive for
workers to apply to firms who oﬀer the monopsony wage. Oﬀering a higher wage than the monopsony wage
1Usually, the equilibrium in directed search models is constraint eﬃcient, e.g. Moen (1999), Montgomery (1991), Peters
(1991).
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only marginally increases the number of applicants in expectation, because workers mainly care about the
probability to get multiple oﬀers, while the expected firm payoﬀs in case of a match drop linearly.
In section 3 we also allow for free entry of vacancies. We do this by allowing the output of both sectors
to be traded in a competitive goods market where consumers have love-for-variety demand for both types of
output and both types are imperfect substitutes.2 Now, not only the workers’ incentives are distorted, but
also firms’ incentives are distorted. Vacancy supply in each sector can both be too high or too low while
typically, the market assigns too few workers to the high productivity sector. Even if we restrict the planner
to playing only HH and LL, the ineﬃciency remains.
There are a couple of papers related to what we do. First, Shimer (2005) and Shi (2002) consider a
directed search model with two-sided heterogeneity where workers can only apply to one job and ex post
competition is irrelevant. They find that the decentralized market outcome is constrained eﬃcient. Our
model reduces to Albrecht et al. (2006) when both sectors have the same productivity. Then, workers
randomize between all firms and the possibility of ex post Bertrand competition drives down the ex ante
posted wages to zero. In Gautier and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) workers and firms are also identical and
workers only learn about the wage after a firm is contacted. There, wages and the number of applications
are determined in a simultaneous move game. Chade and Smith (2004) and Galenianos and Kircher (2005)
also consider portfolio problems of workers who can apply to multiple jobs. In the latter paper, all jobs have
the same productivity but because firms must commit to their posted wages they respond to the worker’s
desire to diversify. This desire to diversify is driven by the fact that the expected payoﬀ is equal to the
maximum wage oﬀer of a worker and not to the average one. Chade and Smith (2004) is not an equilibrium
model but it considers a general class of portfolio problems in the absence of ex post competition. Finally,
Davis (2001) analyzes a model in which workers and firms can decide to invest in respectively human capital
and job quality. Because they cannot capture the full increase of the match surplus generated by these
investments, both firms and workers tend to underinvest. In equilibrium there is excessive supply of inferior
jobs and inferior workers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic version of the model in which the number
of vacancies is assumed to be exogenously given. This assumption is relaxed in the extended model in
section 3. In section 4 we check whether our conclusions are sensitive to the assumptions we make. Section
5 concludes.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Labor Market
Consider a labor market with u risk neutral workers and v risk neutral firms. All workers are identical, but
the firms are divided into two diﬀerent types. There are vH high-productivity firms and vL low-productivity
2The fixed vacancy supply case can be considered to be a special case with Leontief demand. Further, if output in both
sectors are perfect substitutes, only one good will be produced namely the one where the expected value of a vacancy is highest.
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firms, with v = vH + vL. We refer to those firms as highs and lows. Each firm has exactly one vacancy.
Workers can send zero, one, or two applications at costs k > 0. Those applications can be directed to
a specific type of vacancy, but workers do not observe ex ante the wage that a particular firm oﬀers. If a
worker receives multiple job oﬀers, there is Bertrand competition for his services. Basically, workers face a
portfolio problem: they have to decide whether they want to send both applications to high type vacancies,
both applications to low type vacancies, or one application to a high type and one to a low type vacancy.
We will show that if there are not too many firms in the market and if the productivity of the low type firms
is not too small, our results carry over to a directed search setting, where workers observe ex ante the wages
at each individual firm.
We make three important further assumptions. First, we assume that the labor market is large, i.e.
u → ∞ and v → ∞, keeping θi ≡ vi/u fixed ∀i ∈ {H,L}. For the moment, we assume that θH and θL
are exogenously given. We relax this assumption in section 3. Second, we focus on symmetric equilibria,
which means that identical agents must have identical strategies. This excludes equilibria that require a lot
of coordination amongst workers, something that seems hard to imagine in a large labor market. Third, we
assume like Shimer (2005) that the labor market is anonymous: firms must treat identical workers identically
and vice versa. So, a worker’s strategy may only be conditioned on the type (H or L) of the firm.
2.2 Setting of the Game
The model that is closest related to ours is the one used in Albrecht et al. (2006). There are two diﬀerences:
(i) we allow for heterogeneity amongst firms and (ii) search is not fully directed. The setting of the game is
as follows:
1. Each vacancy posts a wage mechanism.
2. Workers observe all vacancy types (but not the wage mechanism) and send a ∈ {0, 1, 2} applications.
3. Each vacancy that receives at least one application, randomly selects a candidate. Applications that
are not selected are returned as rejections.
4. A vacancy with a processed application oﬀers the applicant the job. If the applicant receives more
than one oﬀer, the firms in question can increase their bids as often as they like.
5. A worker that receives one job oﬀer will accept that oﬀer as long as the oﬀered wage is non-negative. A
worker with two oﬀers will accept the one that gives him the highest wage, or will select a job randomly
if the oﬀered wages are equal.
If a type i firm matches with a worker, it produces yi units of output. Without loss of generality we
assume that yL < yH = 1. The payoﬀ of a firm that matches with a worker equals yi −w, where w denotes
the wage that the firm pays. A worker hired at wage w receives a payoﬀ that is equal to that wage. Workers
and firms that fail to match receive payoﬀs of zero.
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2.3 Decentralized Market
We start the analysis of the decentralized market by showing that no firm posts a positive wage. This is
basically the Diamond (1971) paradox.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium all firms post a wage equal to zero
Proof. Note that workers can direct their applications to a specific kind of vacancy, but not to a
particular firm. So, posting a higher wage (or more general: a more generous wage mechanism) does not
attract more applicants and does not aﬀect the matching probability. This implies that there is no incentive
for a firm to oﬀer the worker more than zero.3
A direct result of this lemma is that workers never send only one application.
Corollary 1 No equilibrium exists in which there are workers that only send one application.
Proof. Note that if a worker sends one application, there will never be ex post competition for his
services. Firms oﬀer a wage equal to zero, so the worker’s payoﬀ always equals −k. Hence, applying to one
job is strictly dominated by not applying at all and therefore never part of an equilibrium strategy.
Whether a worker applies twice or not at all depends on the cost k of sending an application. For example if
k > 0.5, each worker will decide not to apply, because applying twice costs more than the competitive wage
(2k > 1 = yH). On the other hand, all workers apply to two jobs if k is suﬃciently small, because this gives
a strictly positive expected payoﬀ, while not applying results in a payoﬀ of zero. In this paper we restrict
ourselves to the situation in which k is small enough to guarantee that a = 2 with probability 1.4 In this
respect our model diﬀers from Shimer (2005) and Shi (2002) where a = 1.
Three diﬀerent strategies are possible: a worker can either apply to two high type vacancies, two low type
vacancies, or one high type and one low type of vacancy. Denote the respective probabilities by qHH , qLL,
and qHL, where qHH + qLL+ qHL = 1. Using the fact that each worker uses the same strategies, this implies
that the total number of applications to firms of type i is equal to (2qii + qHL)u. The expected number of
applications a specific vacancy receives, is therefore given by
φi (qii, qHL, θi) =
2qii + qHL
θi
. (1)
Since our labor market is large, the actual number of applications to a specific vacancy follows a Poisson
distribution with mean φi.
5 Next, consider a single individual who applies to a type i firm. The number of
competitors for the job at that firm also follows a Poisson distribution with mean φi, because there is an
infinite number of workers. In case of n other applicants, the probability that the individual in question will
3Note that this argument implies that posting a wage equal to zero does not only dominate posting a strictly positive wage,
but also all other feasible wage mechanisms.
4An explicit expression for the upperbound K on k in that case is derived below.
5For ease of exposition we omit the arguments of functions whenever this does not lead to confusion.
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get the job equals 1
n+1 . Therefore, the probability that an application to a type i firm results in a job oﬀer
equals
ψi =
∞X
n=0
1
n+ 1
e−φiφni
n!
=
1
φi
¡
1− e−φi
¢
. (2)
Note that this expression is not well defined for φi = 0. For convenience we define ψi (0) = limφi→0 ψi (φi) =
1.
Whether a worker’s second application results in an oﬀer does not depend on whether the first application
was successful or not. A worker who plays ij (i.e. applies to a type i firm and a type j firm) with i, j ∈ {H,L}
therefore has a probability ψiψj of getting two job oﬀers and a probability ψi
¡
1− ψj
¢
+ψj (1− ψi) of getting
one job oﬀer. The matching probability of such a worker equals one minus the probability that he does not
get a job oﬀer and is therefore equal to 1− (1− ψi)
¡
1− ψj
¢
(see Albrecht et al., 2006 for a proof in the case
with homogenous firms). This matching probability is obviously strictly increasing in both ψi and ψj and
depends on the worker’s portfolio choice.
If a worker receives two high job oﬀers, Bertrand competition between the two firms results in a wage
equal to yH = 1. In case of two low oﬀers, the firms increase their bids until the worker’s wage equals yL.
A combination of one high and one low oﬀer also implies a wage of yL, because at that wage level the low
type firm is no longer willing to increase its bid. This is the standard result from Bertrand competition. As
shown above, a worker who receives only one job oﬀer gets a wage equal to zero.
Next, we prove that workers never send one application to a high firm and one to a low firm:
Lemma 2 Workers never play HL, since this strategy is strictly dominated.
Proof. The expected payoﬀ for a worker who plays HL is ψHψLyL − 2k, i.e. the probability that he
receives two job oﬀers times the productivity of the low type firm minus the application cost. Likewise, the
expected payoﬀs of playing HH and LL are ψ2HyH−2k and ψ2LyL−2k respectively. Suppose that ψH ≥ ψL.
In that case all workers play HH, since that strategy gives a strictly higher payoﬀ than HL and LL. This
however implies that φL = 0 and thus that ψL = 1, which contradicts ψH ≥ ψL. Hence, in equilibrium it
must be the case that ψL > ψH . Then, playing LL gives a strictly higher payoﬀ than HL. So, HL is strictly
dominated.
Lemma 2 implies that there are only two potential pure strategy equilibria, one in which workers send both
applications to high type firms and one in which they send both applications to low type firms. In the
following Proposition we show that the latter can never be an equilibrium, while the former can, but only
under certain conditions.
Proposition 1 A pure strategy equilibrium for the workers only exists if
θ2H
4
µ
1− exp
µ
− 2
θH
¶¶2
> yL. (3)
6
In that case q∗HH = 1.
Proof. There are two possibilities for a pure strategy (in terms of the sector to apply to): (i) qLL = 1
and (ii) qHH = 1. The case in which qHL = 1 is ruled out by lemma 2. Since we only consider strategies in
which workers apply twice, we can safely ignore the application cost k in this proof. This parameter only
plays a role in comparing the payoﬀs of strategies that diﬀer in the number of applications sent.
(i) Suppose that qLL = 1. The expected payoﬀ for the workers then is ψ
2
LyL < yL. A worker who deviates
and applies twice to a high firm gets two high job oﬀers and therefore a wage that equals yH = 1 > yL. So,
a profitable deviation exists, which implies that qLL = 1 is not an equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose that qHH = 1. The expected payoﬀ for the workers is in that case ψ
2
H =
θ2H
4
³
1− exp
³
− 2
θH
´´2
.
Deviating to LL gives a wage yL for sure. So q∗HH = 1 is an equilibrium if condition (3) holds.
Hence, we have a pure strategy equilibrium in which all firms post a wage equal to zero and all workers
apply twice to high type vacancies if condition (3) holds. This condition imposes very low upperbounds on
yL for any reasonable value of θH (e.g. θH = 0.5 implies yL < 0.06). The case in which the condition does
not hold is therefore more interesting. Then, we only have a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 2 A unique mixed strategy equilibrium exists for any θH > 0, θL > 0, and yL ∈ (0, 1) such
that θ
2
H
4
³
1− exp
³
− 2
θH
´´2
< yL. This equilibrium can be characterized by the value q∗HH that solves the
equality ψ2H = ψ
2
LyL.
Proof. Again, we can rule out the possibility that workers play HL because of lemma 2. The only mixed
strategy equilibrium that can exist is therefore one in which the workers are indiﬀerent between playing HH
and LL, i.e. ψ2H = ψ
2
LyL.
If we substitute qLL = 1− qHH , the only free parameter in this condition is qHH . To see that a unique
equilibrium value q∗HH exists, note that the left hand side of the condition is continuous and strictly decreasing
in qHH , while the right hand side is continuous and strictly increasing in qHH (see Figure 1). Furthermore,
we have
lim
qHH→0
ψ2H = 1 >
θ2L
4
µ
1− exp
µ
− 2
θL
¶¶2
yL = lim
qHH→0
ψ2LyL
and
lim
qHH→1
ψ2H =
θ2H
4
µ
1− exp
µ
− 2
θH
¶¶2
< yL = lim
qHH→1
ψ2LyL.
Applying the Intermediate Value Theorem now shows that there exists a unique value 0 < q∗HH < 1 such
that ψ2H = ψ
2
LyL holds.
Unfortunately, we are not able to derive an explicit expression for q∗HH . Figure 1 shows the equilibrium as
the intersection point of the ψ2H-curve and the ψ
2
LyL-curve for θH = θL = 0.5 and yL = 0.5. For those values
63% of the workers plays HH, while 37% plays LL.
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In equilibrium the expected payoﬀ for a worker equals ψ2H − 2k = ψ2LyL − 2k. The requirement that
this value should be larger than the payoﬀ of not applying at all, i.e. zero, implies that k should be smaller
than 12ψ
2
H =
1
2ψ
2
LyL. This assumption seems reasonable. It is hard to imagine that the cost of a particular
application exceeds half the expected wage of a job.
The equilibrium depends on three exogenous parameters, θH , θL, and yL. The eﬀect of a change in one of
these parameters on the equilibrium values of q∗HH , φ
∗
i and ψ
∗
i is summarized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 (i) q∗HH , ψ
∗
H , and ψ
∗
L are strictly increasing in θH , while φ
∗
H and φ
∗
L are strictly decreasing
in θH . (ii) ψ
∗
H and ψ
∗
L are strictly increasing in θL, while q
∗
HH , φ
∗
H and φ
∗
L are strictly decreasing in θL.
(iii) ψ∗H and φ
∗
L are strictly increasing in yL, while q
∗
HH , ψ
∗
L and φ
∗
H are strictly decreasing in yL.
Proof. See appendix.
This result is intuitive. A ceteris paribus increase in the number of high productivity firms increases the
probability that an application to a firm of this type results in a match. Therefore, it becomes more attractive
to play HH, resulting in a higher value of q∗HH . The eﬀect of the increase in the number of firms however
dominates this increase in q∗HH , such that the probability to get a job oﬀer increases. Since less workers
apply to low productivity firms, the probability to get a job oﬀer increases there as well.
The eﬀect of an increase in the number of low firms is similar: more workers apply to this type of vacancies
and the probability to get a job oﬀer increases at both the high and the low types of firms. A change in the
productivity of the low firms does not directly aﬀect the probability to match, but it does aﬀect the payoﬀ
in case a worker receives two job oﬀers from low type firms. A higher productivity of the low productivity
firms is therefore associated with more applications to these firms (see also Figure 2). The number of low
firms does however not change, which implies that the probability to get a job oﬀer decreases.
2.4 Eﬃciency
In the mixed strategy equilibrium that we derived in the previous subsection, a fraction q∗HH of the workers
matches with probability 1− (1− ψ∗H)
2 to a high firm and produce output yH = 1. The remaining workers
match with probability 1− (1− ψ∗L)
2 to a low firm and produce output yL. The total output Y ∗ per worker
in this equilibrium is therefore given by
Y ∗ = q∗HH
³
1− (1− ψ∗H)
2
´
+ (1− q∗HH)
³
1− (1− ψ∗L)
2
´
yL.
The main question of this paper is whether the equilibrium value q∗HH is constrained eﬃcient. In order to
answer this question we consider a social planner who maximizes total output in the economy. The planner
cannot eliminate the coordination frictions, but he can decide to which firms the workers apply. In other
words, he can control qHH , qLL, and qHL. In section 3 we allow for free entry of vacancies and let the planner
also determine θH and θL.
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Note that although in the decentralized market nobody would ever play HL, the social planner can have
an incentive to let people play this strategy. Workers do not play HL themselves, because they are only
interested in getting two job oﬀers in the same sector. However, from the planner’s point of view two job
oﬀers to the same worker is always ineﬃcient, because in that case one firm remains unmatched, while it
could have matched with a worker without any job oﬀers. Hence, all workers ideally receive only one job
oﬀer. The planner can however not coordinate the job oﬀers, so the only way in which he can reduce the
coordination problem is by spreading the applications as much as possible, i.e. by playing HL.
We assume that the social planner can also decide which job a worker will take if he receives both a high
and a low job oﬀer. Suppose that he sends a fraction α of those workers to the high type firm and a fraction
1 − α to the low type firm. Then we can derive χkij , i, j, k ∈ {H,L}, which represents the probability that
playing ij results in a match with a type k firm. These probabilities are functions of α, ψH , and ψL:
χHHH = 1− (1− ψH)
2 (4)
χHHL = αψHψL + ψH (1− ψL) (5)
χLLL = 1− (1− ψL)
2 (6)
χLHL = (1− α)ψHψL + ψL (1− ψH) . (7)
The remaining probabilities, like χLHH , are equal to zero. Using this notation, we can write the per-worker
output created by the high and the low types firms as
YH = qHHχ
H
HH + qHLχ
H
HL (8)
and
YL =
¡
qLLχ
L
LL + qHLχ
L
HL
¢
yL. (9)
This implies that the social planner wants to solve the following maximization problem:
max
qHH ,qLL,qHL,α
qHHχ
H
HH + qHLχ
H
HL +
¡
qLLχ
L
LL + qHLχ
L
HL
¢
yL, (10)
subject to qHH + qLL + qHL = 1.
Solving this maximization problem would give us the optimal values q∗∗ij and α
∗, which can be used to
calculate Y ∗∗, the level of output in that case. However, the noninvertibility of ψi, and thus of χ
i
ij, prevents
us from finding an explicit solution for these parameters. We therefore maximize equation (10) numerically.6
The most important diﬀerence between the decentralized market and the social planner concerns workers
playing HL. In the decentralized market nobody plays HL, while the social planner imposes this strategy
on a large group of workers. For many values of {θH , θL, yL} the planner even lets all workers play this
strategy. This is for example the case for θH = θL ≤ 0.5 and yL ∈ (0, 1). The planner only considers HH
and LL if (i) the productivity of the L-types firms is very low, (ii) the number of firms in the market is very
6The numerical results in this paper are obtained using Ox version 3.40 (see Doornik, 2002).
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large, or (iii) there is a large diﬀerence between the number of high type firms and the number of low type
firms. We find that α should be equal to 1 in order to maximize the total output, irrespective of the values
of θH and θL. So, if a worker receives a job oﬀer from both the high and the low firm, he must always take
the job at the high type firm because his marginal productivity is higher there.
Next, we consider the ratio Y
∗
Y ∗∗ , i.e. the ratio between the total output in the decentralized equilibrium and
the output level created by the social planner. This ratio is displayed in Figure 3. The first thing that strikes
is that the decentralized equilibrium is in general not eﬃcient. The output in the decentralized market is
only equal to the optimal level for very small values of yL or for yL = 1. The former case is exactly the
situation in which there is a pure strategy equilibrium with all workers applying to high type firms. In the
latter case, there is essentially no diﬀerence between high and low firms. This suggests that the introduction
of heterogeneity distorts incentives.
The model we discuss in this section has two important characteristics that could both potentially cause
the ineﬃciency: (i) the fact that workers in the decentralized market never play HL, while the social planner
does and (ii) the fact that workers can not direct their applications to specific firms. It is important to note
that these two characteristics are not solely responsible for the ineﬃciency. For example, if we constrain the
social planner by not allowing him to let workers play HL, then still the decentralized market outcome is
not fully eﬃcient, although the level of ineﬃciency becomes negligible. Also the second characteristic is not
fully responsible for the ineﬃciency. General expressions for an equilibrium in a directed search framework
are hard to derive, but the equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the equilibrium outcomes of a
directed search model for many values of θH , θL, and yL, as we state in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that k small enough to guarantee that all workers send two applications.7 Then,
for θH and θL suﬃciently small or for yL suﬃciently large, the equilibrium outcomes described in section
2.3 are the same as in the directed search version of our model where workers observe all wages before they
apply.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 4 shows for which values of θH = θL = 12θ and yL the random search equilibrium values are the
same as the directed search equilibrium values. As we prove in the appendix, only a low type firm can
have an incentive to deviate from posting a wage equal to zero. It posts a positive wage if it cannot attract
enough applications otherwise. This is the case if there are many other firms in the market or if the low
type firms have a low productivity, which makes it unattractive for the workers to apply there. So, under
directed search with multiple applications and firm heterogeneity, the standard positive relation between
posted wages and productivity breaks down. In Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) this happens for similar
reasons. In their model, workers agree to accept a lower initial wage at high productive firms because of
7Under directed search we can have an equilibrium with a = 1 for some values of k. Since this is a special case of the model
described in Shimer (2005), we focus on suﬃciently low values of k such that a = 2.
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future possibilities of wage increases through Bertrand competition with rival firms. In the directed search
version of our model, high productivity firms always get away with posting the reservation wage while low
productivity firms do not because the payoﬀ of receiving multiple oﬀers from high productivity firms is more
attractive than from low productivity firms.
The fact that the equilibrium values under random search and directed search can coincide implies that
the ineﬃciency of the decentralized equilibrium can not be eliminated by making search fully directed.
The social planner does not only generate a higher level of social welfare but also a lower unemployment rate
than the market, as is shown in Figure 5 for θH = θL = 0.5. In the planner’s solution approximately one
third of the workers remains unemployed. This unemployment rate does not depend on yL, reflecting the
fact that the social planner always plays HL and α = 1 for the chosen values of θH and θL. On the other
hand, the unemployment rate in the market does depend on yL: it decreases from 0.57 for yL = 0 to 0.32 for
yL = 1 and is always higher than in the social planner’s solution. The intuition behind this result is simple:
for small values of yL (almost) all workers in the market play HH, which causes large coordination frictions
and thus a high unemployment rate. If yL increases, a larger fraction of the workers starts to apply to low
type vacancies (see Figure 2). This reduces the coordination frictions, since the same number of applications
is now spread over more vacancies. As a result, the number of workers who fail to match decreases. The
social planner minimizes the coordination frictions by letting everybody play HL.
Figure 6 shows the ratio between the number of matches in the high and the low sector. Again, this ratio
is constant for the social planner. In the market this ratio is very high for low values of yL, which is caused
by the fact that (almost) all workers play HH in that case. The low value of yL implies that a worker can
hardly earn anything in the low sector, even if he gets two oﬀers. Therefore, all workers try to get two oﬀers
in the high sector, even though the probability that this occurs is rather small. If yL increases, the ratio
between the number of matches in the high and the low sector decreases, eventually becoming equal to one
for the homogenous case, i.e. yL = 1.
To sum up, for a fixed supply of vacancies the market equilibrium is ineﬃcient mainly because workers
never play HL. Therefore, the coordination frictions are larger than necessary. Galenianos and Kircher
(2005) derive a similar result under a diﬀerent wage mechanism (no ex post competition, directed search and
full commitment). Finally, note that in Albrecht et al. (2006) this ineﬃciency is absent but they show that
entry is excessive when workers apply to multiple jobs. In this section we fixed θi, so their ineﬃciency does
not arise here. In the next section we relax this assumption.
3 The Goods Market and Free Entry
3.1 Setting of the Game
The aim of this section is to investigate whether heterogeneity distorts entry decisions under multiple ap-
plications. Therefore, we extend the basic model by introducing a competitive goods market and free entry
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of firms. Both types of firms now produce the same amount of output in case of a match (yH = yL = 1),
but the value of these outputs on the goods market may diﬀer. Those values are denoted by pH = 1 (after
normalization) and pL respectively.8 The demand on the goods market is determined by the workers who
receive utility from consuming the high and the low commodity according to the following Cobb-Douglas
utility function with the exogenously given constant 0.5 < λ < 1:9
u (xH , xL) = x
λ
Hx
1−λ
L , (11)
where xi represents the consumption of commodity i. Consumers maximize this utility function under the
budget constraint
xH + pLxL ≤ w, (12)
where w denotes the wage of the worker. Basically, output from both sectors is traded in a competitive goods
market where λ reflects the relative preference for the H-good. Here both goods are imperfect substitutes
and therefore strictly positive quantities of both goods are consumed.
Before creating a job opening, firms need to buy one unit of installment capital which costs cH for high
type firms and cL for low type firms. If a firm matches with a worker, then it can use the value of the output
to cover these costs. Otherwise, it incurs a loss. We assume free entry of vacancies. Hence, risk-neutral
firms enter until the point where expected benefits are zero. The other characteristics of the model remain
the same. Workers still send two applications and firms can increase their initial bid in case their candidate
receives multiple oﬀers.
3.2 Decentralized Market
Several of the results derived for the basic model carry over to this more extended version. For example,
it remains optimal for all firms to initially post a wage equal to zero. Again, if a worker receives two job
oﬀers, the firms will increase their bids and Bertrand competition pushes the wages to the marginal product.
Therefore, the expected wage of a worker who applies twice to a type i firm is equal to ψ2i pi, the probability
of receiving two job oﬀers multiplied by the value of the output of a type i firm.
The main diﬀerence with the model of the previous section is that workers playing HL and receiving two
job oﬀers can now be hired by either the high or the low type firm. Which firm hires depends on the value
of pL, which now is an endogenous variable. As long as pL < 1, the high type firm wins the Bertrand game
and hires the workers at a wage pL. On the other hand, if pL > 1 the worker matches with the low type firm
at a wage equal to 1. In the case that pL = 1 both firms employ the worker with probability 12 . Hence, the
expected wage of a worker who plays HL is ψHψLmin {1, pL}.
8The assumption yL = 1 is without loss of generality, since only the total value of the output, i.e. yLpL, is relevant in our
analysis. Fixing yL to a value diﬀerent from 1 therefore only implies a rescaling of pL.
9Note that the labels high and low no longer refer to the productivity of a firm, since the productivity is assumed to be the
same for both types. We nevertheless stick to these labels in order to keep notation consistent. Instead, one can interpret the
labels in the following way: high type firms create a commodity that has a heavier weight
?
λ > 1
2
?
in (11) than the commodity
created by the low type firms
?
1− λ < 1
2
?
.
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However, again one can show that HL is dominated by either HH or LL. The proof is similar to the one
in Lemma 2. Only if pL = 1 and ψH = ψL, workers are indiﬀerent between playing HH, LL, and HL, but
this is only because in that case all jobs are identical. In all other cases, workers will only consider playing
HH and LL.
A firm of type i has a positive revenue if it attracts at least one applicant and if the worker to which it
oﬀers the job, does not receive a second job oﬀer. The first event happens with probability
¡
1− e−φi
¢
, while
the probability of the latter equals (1− ψi).10 Therefore, the expected profit of such a firm equals
πi =
¡
1− e−φi
¢
(1− ψi) pi − ci,
which under free entry is equal to zero in equilibrium. From this, one can see that an equilibrium in which
HL is not strictly dominated, i.e. with pL = 1 and ψH = ψL, can only arise if cH = cL.
In equilibrium, the ratio of the prices of the commodities must equal the (absolute value of the) marginal
rate of substitution (MRS):
pL
pH
=
∂U/∂xL
∂U/∂xH
¯¯¯¯
xH=YH ,xL=YL
=
1− λ
λ
YH
YL
. (13)
The expected per-worker output created by the high type firms is qHH
³
1− (1− ψH)
2
´
, while the low type
firms produce (1− qHH)
³
1− (1− ψL)
2
´
per worker. So, equation (13) is equivalent to
pL =
1− λ
λ
qHH
1− qHH
1− (1− ψH)
2
1− (1− ψL)
2 .
Summarizing we can define the equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1 An equilibrium in the decentralized market is a tuple {pL, θH , θL, qHH} such that the following
four conditions hold:
ψ2H = ψ
2
LpL (14)
pL =
1− λ
λ
qHH
1− qHH
1− (1− ψH)
2
1− (1− ψL)
2 (15)¡
1− e−φH
¢
(1− ψH) = cH (16)¡
1− e−φL
¢
(1− ψL) =
cL
pL
(17)
Equation (14) represents the indiﬀerence condition for the workers, while equation (15) makes sure that the
price of the low commodity equals the MRS. Equation (16) and (17) are the zero-profit conditions for the
high and low type firms respectively. Next, we can show that there is a unique equilibrium.
Proposition 5 In a decentralized market a unique equilibrium {p∗L, θ∗H , θ∗L, q∗HH} exists ∀ 0 < cH , cL < 1.
10Due to the infinite size of the labor market, these events are independent.
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Proof. See appendix.
This extended version of the model also has three exogenous parameters, cH , cL, and λ. The following
proposition summarizes how the equilibrium is aﬀected by a change in cL, the entry cost of the low type
firms.
Proposition 6 φ∗L, p∗L, q
∗
HH , and θ
∗
H are strictly increasing in cL, while θ
∗
L is strictly decreasing in cL.
Finally, φ∗H is not aﬀected by a change in cL.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is the following. An increase in cL reduces profits for low type firms
and therefore fewer L-vacancies are opened. This makes it relatively more attractive to apply to the high
type firms, implying that q∗HH increases. This pushes up the profits for high type firms, which induces more
high type vacancies to be opened. This increase in θ∗H exactly oﬀsets the increase in q
∗
HH such that the
probability to get a job after applying to a high type firm remains constant.
The above Proposition also allows us to compare the high type vacancies with the low type vacancies.
It turns out that the entry cost is decisive for which type of vacancies receives more applications and gets a
higher price for the created output:
Corollary 2 In the decentralized equilibrium, the vacancy type with the higher entry cost receives more
applications, provides the worker with a smaller probability of getting a job oﬀer, and has a higher price for
the associated produced commodity.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the previous Proposition with pˆ∗L replaced by p
∗
H ≡ 1, φˆ
∗
L by
φ∗H , ψˆ
∗
L by ψ
∗
H , and cˆL by cH .
The second exogenously given parameter is the entry cost for the high type firms. An increase in this
parameter decreases the price of the low commodity, but increases the expected number of applications to
both high and low type vacancies. This is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 φ∗H and φ
∗
L are strictly increasing in cH , while p
∗
L is strictly decreasing in cH .
Proof. The free entry condition for the H-firms shows that an increase in cH strictly increases φ∗H . This
means that ψ∗H strictly decreases. For the indiﬀerence condition to continue to hold, ψL (φ
∗
L (p
∗
L))
2
p∗L has to
decrease as well. Since ψL (φ
∗
L (pL))
2
pL is strictly increasing in pL (see proof of Proposition 5), a decrease
in ψ∗H implies a decrease in p
∗
L and therefore an increase in φ
∗
L.
It is not trivial to analytically derive the eﬀect of an increase in cH on q∗HH , θ
∗
H and θ
∗
L. Since we only have
three exogenous parameters we can rely on numerical computations. We find that the above three variables
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are decreasing in cH . Figures 7, 8 and 9 respectively show q∗HH , θ
∗
H and θ
∗
L as a function of cH for several
values of cL, where λ = 0.6.
The last exogenously given parameter is the preference parameter λ, i.e. the share of income that the workers
spend on consuming the high commodity. Not surprisingly, an increase in λ turns out to have a positive eﬀect
on the fraction of workers applying to the high vacancies and on the number of high vacancies. However, it
causes a decrease in the number of low vacancies. The change in the number of vacancies exactly oﬀsets the
change in q∗HH , so that the expected number of applications per vacancy does not change
Proposition 8 q∗HH , θ
∗
H are strictly increasing in λ, while θ
∗
L is strictly decreasing in λ. A change in λ
does not aﬀect φ∗H , φ
∗
L, and p
∗
L.
Proof. φ∗H is determined by equation (16) only and therefore not aﬀected by a change in λ. This means
that the left hand side of equation (14) remains constant. As we showed in Proposition 5, the right hand
side of this equation is strictly increasing in pL, implying that p∗L, ψ
∗
L, and φ
∗
L do not change either. From
the fact that pL remains constant and λ increases, we can derive that in equation (15) the factor
qHH
1−qHH
must increase. Since the first derivative of this expression is strictly positive, this means that qHH has to
increase. Now it is straightforward to show that θ∗H must increase and θ
∗
L must decrease in order to keep
φ∗H and φ
∗
L fixed.
3.3 Eﬃciency
Since we allow for free entry, we can now test whether the number and composition of vacancies is constrained
eﬃcient. Specifically, we assume that the social planner can again determine qHH , qLL, qHL, and α, like in
the basic model, but now he can also determine the number and composition of firms in the market, θH and
θL. Using the same definitions for χkij as in section 2.4, we can write Yi, i.e. total output created by type i
firms, as follows:
YH = qHHχ
H
HH + qHLχ
H
HL
and
YL = qLLχ
L
LL + qHLχ
L
HL.
Next, denote the net value of the output per worker by V :
V = pHYH + pLYL − θHcH − θLcL.
The social planner is not concerned with redistribution issues. He just wants to maximize social welfare,
i.e. the utility that can be obtained from V . This implies that he maximizes the indirect utility function
associated to the Cobb-Douglas utility function specified in equation (11):
max
qHH ,qLL,qHL,α,θH ,θL
µ
λV
pH
¶λµ
(1− λ)V
pL
¶1−λ
(18)
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under the condition that qHH + qLL + qHL = 1. Again, the price of the low commodity has to be equal to
the marginal rate of substitution. Therefore, we can rewrite equation (18) as follows:
max
qHH ,qLL,qHL,α,θH ,θL
(YH − λθHcH − λθLcL)
µ
YL
YH
¶1−λ
.
The corresponding system of first order conditions cannot be solved analytically. Therefore, we use numerical
optimization methods to derive the optimal values q∗∗HH , q
∗∗
LL, q
∗∗
HL, α
∗∗, θ∗∗H , and θ
∗∗
L . The results indicate
that the optimal value for q∗∗LL equals 0, i.e. the social planner does not let workers play LL.
11 The optimal
values for q∗∗HH = 1− q∗∗HL are displayed in Figure 10 for several values of cL and λ = 0.6.12 Each line shows
two clear jumps. The first jump occurs where cH = cL, which can be explained by the behavior of α∗∗. This
value is always equal to zero for cH < cL and equal to one for cH > cL, because when a worker receives
both a high and a low type oﬀer, the planner wants the worker to fill the position that is more expensive to
create. Ceteris paribus, this jump in α∗∗ at cH = cL increases the probability for a high firm to match and
decreases the probability for a low firm to match. Since the output the planner wants to create in the high
and the low sector does however not change discontinuously, the positive jump in α∗∗ must be neutralized
by a negative jump in q∗∗HH .
The second jump has no clear economic meaning. It is the result of the fact that the social welfare
function is non-monotonic in its parameters. The value of cH for which this second jump occurs is negatively
related to λ. For large values of λ and cL it can happen that this jump occurs before the point where
cH = cL. In that case, there is only one jump.
Next, we turn to the important question whether there are too many or too few vacancies created in the
decentralized market equilibrium. Albrecht et al. (2006) prove that in their model the market always opens
more vacancies than the social planner if the number of applications is fixed, but that there can be either too
many or too few vacancies if the number of applications is endogenous. In our model we focus on a = 2, but
the composition of these applications over the sectors is endogenous both for the market and the planner.
Unlike in Albrecht et al. (2006), the expected number of applications that a workers sends to a specific
sector can now be a non-integer value, because he can play mixed strategies with respect to the sectors he
applies to. Hence, the heterogeneity amongst the firms gives both the market and the social planner more
freedom in choosing the optimal number of applications, even if the total number of applications is fixed.
Figures 11 and 12 respectively display the number of H-vacancies and the number of L-vacancies created
by the market and the planner as a function of the entry cost for type H firms. The entry cost for type L
firms is fixed at 0.5, while λ is still assumed to be 0.6.13 The Figures show that like in Albrecht et al. (2006)
either too many or too few vacancies (both high and low) are opened in the decentralized market, depending
11This conclusion even holds for cL close to 1 and λ close to 0.5.
12Fixing λ at a diﬀerent value, e.g. 0.9, changes the values of q∗∗HH , q∗∗LL, q∗∗HL, α∗∗, θ
∗∗
H , and θ∗∗L , but none of the qualitative
conclusions in this section.
13Diﬀerent values of cL and λ do not aﬀect the main conclusions.
16
on the values of the exogenous parameters. For low values of cH , the market opens too many vacancies
compared to the social optimum. When cH approaches 1, the reverse holds. In that case, the social planner
creates more vacancies than the market.
The intuition for the latter result is the following. If cH approaches 1 in the decentralized market, no high
firm is willing to enter, because its expected payoﬀ is negative in that case. However, without supply of the
high type commodity, workers can never obtain a positive utility and therefore the entire market collapses:
there are no firms active in equilibrium. The social planner finds this undesirable and still lets firms enter
the market.
In order to check whether the market is constrained eﬃcient, we compare the ratio between the utility
obtained in the decentralized equilibrium (i.e. the indirect utility function evaluated at the equilibrium
values) and the utility associated with the social planner’s solution. This ratio is displayed by the dashed
line in Figure 13 for λ = 0.6. It shows that for small cH , market utility is about 80% of what could be
achieved. As cH increases, the ineﬃciency goes up and when cH approaches 1, the ratio of market and
planner’s utility goes to zero.
The intuition for this result is the same as above: in the decentralized market no vacancies are created
if cH approaches 1. The social planner however does create vacancies in that case. So, for cH close enough
to 1, the created output is virtually zero in the decentralized market but strictly positive under the social
planner. This implies that the relative eﬃciency of the decentralized market equilibrium goes to 0.
To see to what extent this ineﬃciency is caused by the fact that the planner plays HL, we also consider
a constrained planner who can only play (a mixture of) HH and LL. The eﬃciency of the decentralized
equilibrium relative to this constrained planner’s optimum is displayed in Figure 13 by the solid line. The
line shows that in this case the ineﬃciency is almost as large as in the case with the unconstrained planner.
This is dramatically diﬀerent from the model in section 2 where most of the market ineﬃciency was due to
the fact that workers do not play HL. It suggests that our results are not driven by the fact that we only
have two jobs types, which makes the ineﬃciency due to not playing HL relatively large.
The conclusions drawn in section 2.4 about employment in the high and the low sector do also not fully
carry over to the extended version of the model. As can be seen in Figure 14, the unemployment rate in the
market is now not always higher than under the social planner. For small values of cH the reverse holds,
which directly follows from the fact that the market opens more vacancies than the planner. Figure 15 shows
that, except for extremely low values of cH (below 0.02), the planner always generates a higher matching
rate in the high sector than the market.
To sum up, the market creates too many vacancies if the vacancy creation costs are low, while it creates
to few vacancies if the high type vacancy creation costs are high. As a result of this, the expected number of
applications that a high type vacancy receives in a decentralized market is larger than socially optimal for
high values of cH and smaller than optimal for low values of cH . A similar pattern is found for the expected
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number of applications received by low type firms. If we restrict the planner to only play HH and LL, this
conclusion still holds.
4 Robustness
In this section we discuss to what extent our results are sensitive to the following three simplifying assump-
tions we made: (i) a worker cannot send more than two applications, (ii) firms cannot oﬀer the job to more
than one applicant, and (iii) firms that compete for the same worker engage in Bertrand competition.
More than two applications
The first simplifying assumption is that a worker cannot send more than two applications. Allowing
workers to apply to more than two jobs makes the analysis more diﬃcult, but does not change the nature of
the portfolio problem. Still workers are only interested in the productivity-weighted probability to get more
than one job oﬀer, while the social planner wants to spread applications in order to reduce the coordination
frictions. So, the fact that we restrict the workers to at most two applications is not driving our main result.
Multiple job oﬀers
The second assumption is that firms can oﬀer the job to one worker only. This can be restrictive even if
we assume that the marginal productivity of a second worker is zero. For example, it can be profitable for a
firm to increase its matching probability by oﬀering the same job to more applicants. The drawback of this
strategy is that the firm then runs the risk that more than one worker accepts the oﬀer. In that case, the
firm has to pay a wage to all the workers it hires, while only one of them can be used in producing output.
Deriving the optimal strategy in such a model is not straightforward. First, timing matters. Suppose
that a firm sends two job oﬀers. Initially, it oﬀers a wage equal to zero to both applicants. If one of the
candidates has also received another oﬀer, the firm must decide whether it will compete for this worker. The
strategy of the firm depends on the result of the second job oﬀer it has made. Therefore, one must make
assumptions about the exact moment at which the firm learns the result of each job oﬀer.
One way to solve the timing problem is by assuming that if their candidate has multiple oﬀers, the firms
participate in a second-price sealed bid auction, rather than Bertrand competition.14 In that case all firms
submit one bid wi and the bids are revealed simultaneously. The winning firm hires the worker and pays a
wage equal to the bid of the competing firm (and zero if there was no competing firm). If firms can make
only one job oﬀer, it is optimal for them to bid the productivity level, wi = yi. Hence, in that case the
payoﬀs are identical to the payoﬀs described in the previous sections, i.e. under the assumption of Bertrand
competition.
If firms can however make more than one job oﬀer, deriving the optimal wage oﬀer remains diﬃcult. First,
it is relevant whether the other oﬀer of the firm’s candidate is at a firm with multiple candidates or not. If
it is not, the other firm will bid more aggressively. Second, there is no pure strategy equilibrium because
14See Julien et al. (2000), Kulti (1999) and Shimer (1999).
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each candidate equilibrium wage pair is dominated by either oﬀering one of the candidates a zero wage or
oﬀering them ε more. This is essentially the well known Burdett-Judd (1983) argument. An alternative
is the shortlisting assumption of Albrecht et al. (2006) where firms pick a first candidate and a second
candidate to whom they oﬀer the job (if she is still available) in case they fail to hire their first candidate.
At each of the firms they apply to, workers can be in three possible states: first candidate, second candidate
or neither. This makes the algebra tedious but the bottom line is that none of the coordination frictions is
eliminated . Even if a firm makes b job oﬀers, it is still possible that it remains unmatched, because all the
workers accepted oﬀers from other firms. Moreover, workers still only care about receiving two oﬀers while
the planner wants to maximize the output-weighted number of matches. Finally, Gautier et al. (2005) and
Kircher (2005) consider the case where firms can consider as many applicants as they like. Kircher shows that
if firms commit to their posted wage, the directed search equilibrium is eﬃcient. If firms can increase their
initial bids, in case their (final) candidate has multiple oﬀers, the remaining equilibrium remains ineﬃcient.
No Bertrand Competition
The third assumption concerns Bertrand competition for workers with two oﬀers. Alternatives are for ex-
ample commitment of the firms to their initial bids, as in Galenianos and Kircher (2005) or oﬀer-beating
strategies as in Albrecht et al. (2006). Assuming commitment is basically a restriction on the firm’s strategy
space. Oﬀer-beating strategies expand the firm’s strategy space. Basically, the thread of Bertrand com-
petition can reduce ex post competition and typically multiple equilibria arise. Reducing competition for
workers implies that a larger part of the surplus goes to the firms and consequently entry increases. We saw
that for low entry cost of H-firms, vacancy supply in both sectors was already excessive so reducing ex post
competition can never generically increase eﬃciency.
5 Final Remarks
We presented a simple model where workers could apply to multiple, heterogeneous jobs. Workers do not
apply to firms with the highest expected payoﬀs for an individual application but rather maximize the value
of their portfolio. We also extend the model with free entry.
The resulting equilibrium is not eﬃcient for two reasons. Workers want to maximize the productivity-
weighted probability to get two job oﬀers, while the planner aims to maximize the productivity-weighted
number of matches. This conflict of interest results in too little matches and excessive unemployment. We
showed that this result is not driven by the fact that search is random in our model. For a large share of
parameter values the posted wages are also zero in the directed search version of our model as in Albrecht
et al. (2006).
If we allow for free entry there is a second source of ineﬃciency. For high creation cost in the high
productivity sector, the market creates too little vacancies. If entry cost are high, the risk of Bertrand
competition makes firms stop entering the market at a point where the marginal social benefits are still
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positive. On the other hand if entry cost are low, vacancy creation is excessive because the absence of ex
ante competition gives firms too much rents. The vacancy creation distortions can in principle be neutralized
by an appropriately chosen firm tax or subsidy scheme. The workers’ portfolio distortions are more severe.
Governments may have instruments to make one of the sectors more attractive but this will only increase
the fraction of workers who send both applications to this sector without increasing the fraction of workers
that mixes between sectors.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (i) First, note that
∂ψi
∂φi
=
1
φ2i
¡
(1 + φi) e
−φi − 1
¢
< 0, (19)
since eφi > 1 + φi ∀φi > 0. Using this and
∂φi
∂θi
< 0, we can derive that ∂ψ
2
H
∂θH
= 2ψH
∂ψH
∂φH
∂φH
∂θH
> 0, which
means that an increase in θH shifts the ψ
2
H-curve in Figure 1 upwards. On the other hand,
∂ψ2LyL
∂θH
= 0, so
an increase in θH does not aﬀect the ψ
2
LyL-curve. Hence, the intersection point of the two curves moves to
the northeast, implying an increase in the equilibrium value q∗HH and in the expected payoﬀs. This means
that both ψ∗H and ψ
∗
L increase and both φ
∗
H and φ
∗
L decrease.
(ii) Note that ∂ψ
2
LyL
∂θL
= 2ψLyL
∂ψL
∂φL
∂φL
∂θL
> 0. Hence, an increase in θL shifts ψ
2
LyL-curve upwards, but
does not aﬀect the ψ2H-curve. Therefore, q
∗
HH decreases, while ψ
∗
H and ψ
∗
L increase and, consequently, φ
∗
H
and φ∗L decrease.
(iii) Finally, an increase in yL shifts the ψ
2
LyL-curve upwards, but does not aﬀect the ψ
2
H-curve. Therefore,
q∗HH decreases, while ψ
∗
H increases. The latter implies a decrease in φ
∗
H . Since θL remains constant, the
decrease in q∗HH results in an increase in φ
∗
L and consequently a decrease in ψ
∗
L.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose that all firms posting a wage equal to zero is not a directed search equilibrium. Then a
profitable deviation must exist for either the high type firms or the low types firms. Consider a deviation
by a high type firm first. Instead of 0 it posts a strictly positive wage: w0H > 0. Workers now have two
additional application strategies: they can send (i) one application to the deviant and the other one to a
high firm or (ii) one application to the deviant and the other one to a low firm. Denote the former strategy
by H 0H and the latter by H 0L. The payoﬀ of playing H 0H equals
ψ0HψH + ψ
0
H (1− ψH)w0H (20)
and the payoﬀ of H 0L equals
ψ0HψLyL + ψ
0
H (1− ψL)w0H , (21)
where ψ0H is defined in the usual way and denotes the probability that an application to the deviant results
in a job oﬀer.
Since we consider a large labor market, a specific worker applies with probability zero to the deviant.
So, the presence of a deviant does not aﬀect the average number of applications received by the other non-
deviant high or low firms. Therefore, the indiﬀerence condition ψ2H = ψ
2
LyL must still hold. By substituting
22
ψH = ψL
√
yL in equation (20) and using the fact that 1 >
√
yL > yL, one can easily see that H 0L is
dominated by H 0H.
In response to the deviation by one of the high firms, workers will adjust their application strategies
such that they are indiﬀerent between HH, LL and H 0H. The new equilibrium is therefore defined by the
following two equations:
ψ2H = ψ
2
LyL
ψ2H = ψ
0
HψH + ψ
0
H (1− ψH)w0H
Let φ0H denote the expected number of applications that the deviant receives. Then, by substituting
ψ0H =
1
φ0H
³
1− e−φ0H
´
in the second condition and rearranging the result, we can derive the following
relation between the posted wage w0H and φ
0
H :
w0H =
1
1− ψH
µ
φ0Hψ
2
H
1− e−φ0H
− ψH
¶
. (22)
The first derivative of this function with respect to φ0H equals
∂w0H
∂φ0H
=
ψ2H
ψH − 1
e−φ
0
H + φ0He
−φ0H − 1
e−2φ
0
H − 2e−φ0H + 1
> 0 ∀φ0H > 0.
Hence, w0H is a monotonic function of φ
0
H : the higher the wage set by the deviant, the higher the expected
number of applications it receives.
After substituting equation (22), the profit function for a high type deviant equals
π0H =
³
1− e−φ
0
H
´
(1− ψH) (1− w0H)
=
³
1− e−φ
0
H
´
(1− ψH)
µ
1− 1
1− ψH
µ
φ0Hψ
2
H
1− e−φ0H
− ψH
¶¶
.
Deriving this profit function with respect to φ0H yields the following expression:
∂π0H
∂φ0H
= e−φ
0
H − ψ2H ,
which is a strictly decreasing function of φ0H that equals zero for φ
0
H = −2 log (ψH). Therefore, the profit
function has a global maximum in this point. The corresponding value of w0H follows from evaluating equation
(22):
w0H =
ψH
¡
ψ2H − 2ψH log (ψH)− 1
¢
(1− ψH)
2 (1 + ψH)
. (23)
This expression has the same sign as ψ2H − 2ψH log (ψH) − 1. The first derivative of this equation is equal
to 2 (ψH − logψH − 1), which easily can be shown to be positive for all ψH in the interval (0, 1). Together
with the fact that limψH→1 ψ
2
H −2ψH log (ψH)−1 = 0, this implies that the right hand side of equation (23)
is negative ∀ψH ∈ (0, 1). Since we do not allow for negative wages, this optimal value of w0H is not feasible.
Given that the profit is strictly decreasing in φ0H > −2 log (ψH) and that w0H is strictly increasing in φ
0
H , the
profit function maximization problem therefore has a boundary solution: the deviant maximizes its profit
23
by posting w0H = 0. This implies that if all firms post a wage equal to zero, a profitable deviation does not
exist for a high type firm.
Now we perform the same analysis for a low type deviant. Suppose that it posts a wage w0L > 0. In that
case the payoﬀ of playing LL0 equals
ψLψ
0
LyL + ψ
0
L (1− ψL)w0L = ψ0Lw0L + ψ0LψL (yL − w0L)
and the payoﬀ of HL0 equals
ψHψ
0
LyL + ψ
0
L (1− ψH)w0L = ψ0Lw0L + ψ0LψH (yL − w0L) ,
where ψ0L denotes the probability that an application to the deviant results in a job oﬀer.
In a similar way as we described above, one can show that the strategy HL0 is dominated by LL0. The
new equilibrium is therefore defined by the following two indiﬀerence conditions:
ψ2H = ψ
2
LyL
ψ2LyL = ψLψ
0
LyL + ψ
0
L (1− ψL)w0L
Let φ0L denote the expected number of applications that the deviant receives. Then, by substituting
ψ0L =
1
φ0L
³
1− e−φ0L
´
in the second condition and rearranging the result, we can derive the following relation
between the posted wage w0L and φ
0
L:
w0L =
1
1− ψL
µ
φ0Lψ
2
LyL
1− e−φ0L
− ψLyL
¶
. (24)
The first derivative of this function with respect to φ0L equals
∂w0L
∂φ0L
=
³
e−φ
0
L + φ0Le−φ
0
L − 1
´
ψ2LyL¡
e−2φ
0
L − 2e−φ0L + 1
¢
(ψL − 1)
> 0 ∀φ0L > 0.
Hence w0L is a monotonic function of φ
0
L: the higher the wage set by the deviant, the higher the expected
number of applications it receives.
The profit function for the deviant equals
π0H =
³
1− e−φ
0
L
´
(1− ψL) (1− w0L)
=
³
1− e−φ
0
L
´
(1− ψL)
µ
1− 1
1− ψL
µ
φ0Lψ
2
LyL
1− e−φ0L
− ψLyL
¶¶
.
Deriving this this profit function with respect to φ0L yields the following expression:
∂π0L
∂φ0L
= e−φ
0
L (1− (1− yL)ψL)− ψ2LyL,
which is a strictly decreasing function of φ0L that equals zero for φ
0
L = − log κ, where κ ≡
ψ2LyL
1−(1−yL)ψL
.
Therefore the profit function has a global maximum in this point. The corresponding value of w0L follows
from evaluating equation (24):
w0L =
−ψLyL
1− ψL
µ
ψL log κ
1− κ + 1
¶
.
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One can check that limψL→0w
0
L = 0, limψL→0
∂w0L
∂ψL
= −yL < 0 and, by applying l’Hospital’s Rule twice,
limψL→1w
0
L =
1−yL
2 > 0 (see Figure 16). Therefore, it depends on the equilibrium value ψ
∗
L whether a
profitable deviation exists. For ψ∗L close to 0 the optimal value for w
0
L is negative. Given the fact that
∂π0L
∂φ0L
< 0 for φ0L > − log κ and that
∂w0L
∂φ0L
> 0 ∀φ0L > 0, this implies that low type firms have no incentive
to post a wage that is diﬀerent from 0. On the other hand, for ψ∗L close to 1, it is profitable for a low firm
to deviate by posting a wage that is strictly positive. It straightforward to show that both cases can occur.
For example, ψ∗L → 0 if θH → 0, θL → 0 and yL → 1, while ψ∗L → 1 if θH → θˆH where θˆH is such that
θˆ
2
H
4
³
1− exp
³
− 2
θˆH
´´2
= yL.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The function 1− e−φH is strictly positive and strictly increasing ∀φH > 0. The same is true for the
function 1 − ψH = 1 − 1φH
¡
1− e−φH
¢
. Therefore, the revenue for the high firm
¡
1− e−φH
¢
(1− ψH) is a
strictly increasing function of φH with
lim
φH→0
¡
1− e−φH
¢
(1− ψH) = 0
and
lim
φH→∞
¡
1− e−φH
¢
(1− ψH) = 1.
This implies that the condition (16) uniquely identifies a value φ∗H > 0 for any 0 < cH < 1.
Since
¡
1− e−φL
¢
(1− ψL) < 1, a necessary condition for condition (17) to hold is that pL > cL. Assume
for the moment that pL is exogenously given such that this condition is satisfied. In that case any value
0 < cL < 1 uniquely identifies a value φ
∗
L as a function of pL, i.e. φ
∗
L (pL). Since
¡
1− e−φL
¢
(1− ψL) is strictly
increasing in φL, φ
∗
L (pL) is strictly decreasing in pL with limpL→cL φ
∗
L (pL) =∞ and limpL→∞ φ∗L (pL) = 0.
Using this, it follows directly that ψL (φ
∗
L (pL)) and ψL (φ
∗
L (pL))
2
pL are both strictly increasing in pL and
that
lim
pL→cL
ψL (φ
∗
L (pL))
2
pL = 0
and
lim
pL→∞
ψL (φ
∗
L (pL))
2
pL =∞.
This implies that given φ∗H and φ
∗
L (pL) there exists a unique value p
∗
L > cL such that the indiﬀerence
condition is satisfied.
Let φ∗L = φ
∗
L (p
∗
L), ψ
∗
H = ψH (φ
∗
H) and ψ
∗
L = ψL (φ
∗
L (p
∗
L)). Then
lim
qHH→0
1− λ
λ
qHH
1− qHH
1− (1− ψ∗H)
2
1− (1− ψ∗L)
2 = 0,
while
lim
qHH→1
1− λ
λ
qHH
1− qHH
1− (1− ψ∗H)
2
1− (1− ψ∗L)
2 =∞,
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and
d
dqHH
qHH
1− qHH
=
1
(1− qHH)2
> 0.
The Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there exists a unique value 0 < q∗HH < 1 such that p
∗
L equals
the MRS 1−λ
λ
q∗HH
1−q∗HH
1−(1−ψ∗H)
2
1−(1−ψ∗L)
2 . Using q∗HH , φ
∗
H and φ
∗
L, it is straightforward to determine θ
∗
H and θ
∗
L. Now,
the equilibrium is defined by p∗L, θ
∗
H , θ
∗
L, and q
∗
HH .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Let p∗L and pˆ
∗
L be equilibrium prices with p
∗
L > pˆ
∗
L. Using the indiﬀerence condition this implies
ψ∗L < ψˆ
∗
L, which by the definition of ψi is equivalent to φ
∗
L > φˆ
∗
L. Using the inequalities p
∗
L > pˆ
∗
L and
φ∗L > φˆ
∗
L, and the fact that
¡
1− e−φL
¢ ³
1− 1
φL
¡
1− e−φL
¢´
is strictly increasing in φL, one can derive that
cˆL =
³
1− e−φˆ
∗
L
´Ã
1− 1
φˆ
∗
L
³
1− e−φˆ
∗
L
´!
pˆ∗L
<
³
1− e−φ
∗
L
´µ
1− 1
φ∗L
³
1− e−φ
∗
L
´¶
p∗L = cL
Likewise, one can show that p∗L < pˆ
∗
L implies ψ
∗
L > ψˆ
∗
L, φ
∗
L < φˆ
∗
H , and cˆL > cL and that p
∗
L = pˆ
∗
L implies
ψ∗L = ψˆ
∗
L, φ
∗
L = φˆ
∗
H , and cˆL = cL. Since we have listed all possibilities, we can invert this result and state
that cL > cˆL implies φ
∗
L > φˆ
∗
L, ψ
∗
L < ψˆ
∗
L, and p
∗
L > pˆ
∗
L. Hence, φ
∗
L and p
∗
L are strictly increasing in cL. The
equilibrium value of φ∗H is determined by the condition (16) only and therefore not aﬀected by a change in
cL.
Substituting the indiﬀerence condition in the fourth condition and solving for q∗HH yields the following
expression
q∗HH =
2λψ∗H
2λ (ψ∗H − ψ∗L) + (2− ψ∗H)ψ∗L
.
>From this we can derive
dq∗HH
dcL
=
∂q∗HH
∂ψ∗L
∂ψ∗L
∂cL
+
∂q∗HH
∂ψ∗H
dψ∗H
dcL
=
∂q∗HH
∂ψ∗L
∂ψ∗L
∂cL
> 0.
Now we have
∂φ∗H
∂cL
=
∂φ∗H
∂q∗HH
∂q∗HH
∂cL
+
∂φ∗H
∂θ∗H
∂θ∗H
∂cL
.
As shown above, ∂φ
∗
H
∂cL
= 0, while ∂φ
∗
H
∂q∗HH
> 0,
∂q∗HH
∂cL
> 0 and ∂φ
∗
H
∂θ∗H
< 0. This implies ∂θ
∗
H
∂cL
> 0.
Likewise, we have
∂φ∗L
∂cL
=
∂φ∗L
∂q∗HH
∂q∗HH
∂cL
+
∂φ∗L
∂θ∗L
∂θ∗L
∂cL
,
where ∂φ
∗
L
∂cL
> 0, ∂φ
∗
L
∂q∗HH
< 0,
∂q∗HH
∂cL
> 0 and ∂φ
∗
L
∂θ∗L
< 0. This implies ∂θ
∗
L
∂cL
< 0.
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Figure 1: Expected payoﬀ of playing HH and LL for θH = θL = 1 and yL = 0.5
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Figure 2: q∗HH as a function of yL for several values of θH = θL =
1
2θ.
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Figure 3: Eﬃciency of the decentralized equilibrium (Y ∗/Y ∗∗) as a function of yL for several values of
θH = θL =
1
2θ.
28
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
yL
th
et
a
No directed search equilibrium
Directed search equilibrium
Figure 4: Combinations of yL and θH = θL = 12θ for which the equilibrium outcomes of a random search
model and a directed search model coincide.
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Figure 5: Unemployment ratio as a function of yL for θH = θL = 0.5.
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Figure 6: Ratio between employment in the high and low sector as a function of yL for θH = θL = 12 .
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Figure 7: q∗HH as a function of cH for λ = 0.6 and several values of cL.
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Figure 8: θ∗H as a function of cH for λ = 0.6 and several values of cL.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium value θ∗L as a function of cH for λ = 0.6 and several values of cL.
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Figure 10: q∗∗HH as a function of cH for λ = 0.6 and several values of cL.
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Figure 11: The number of high firms in the market as a function of cH for λ = 0.6 and cL = 0.5.
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Figure 12: The number of low firms in the market as a function of cH for λ = 0.6 and cL = 0.5.
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Figure 13: Eﬃciency of the decentralized equilibrium as a function of cH for λ = 0.6 and cL = 0.5.
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Figure 14: Unemployment ratio for cL = 0.5 and λ = 0.6 and cL = 0.5.
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Figure 15: Ratio of employment in high and low sector as a function of cH for λ = 0.6 and cL = 0.5.
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Figure 16: w0L as a function of ψL for several values of yL. Positive values of w
0
L imply that a profitable
deviation exists for a low type firm.
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